Update: VOTE TODAY, TUESDAY NOVEMBER 25th!
Folks in the following counties have an important judicial election tomorrow: Lafayette, Benton, Calhoun, Chickasaw, Marshall, Tippah, Union. The candidates on the ballot are Kelly Luther and Shirley Byers. I have previously posted about Shirley Byers’s prior experience as a judge.
I am supporting Kelly Luther. He has [...]
That memorial lawsuit by the Sons of Confederate Veterans seems to have gone nowhere. They got issued a summons for a Rule 81 hearing (what were they seeking, a divorce?) for a hearing that was never actually scheduled, and a lawyer appeared for the University, and then… nothing. Not even a return on the [...]
Anderson is going to love this one.
This was in the Chittenango, New York may have been in a newspaper’s sports section this morning. From Shannon Lovejoy on Facebook.
Update: I wondered about the cut off masthead, which should have been a big read flag. When someone goof on Facebook tried to foist this off [...]
When I was fourteen, kids in town could sell football programs. We’d get a ticket to the game as a part of the deal, and we’d come home with a good chunk of change if we were good at selling programs. Kids really devoted to making money would sell [...]
New York’s Big Gay Ice Cream Truck is a pioneer and national award winner in the food truck business. They’re doing a Southern Tour, hitting North Carolina, Atlanta (yesterday & today), Birmingham (tomorrow, near Highlands at Five Points), and then Oxford outside Big Bad Breakfast on Friday afternoon. They are writing about the [...]
The Lafayette County Bar will hold a judicial candidate forum on October 21, 2014 at Boure starting at 4PM. All judicial candidates on the ballot in Lafayette County are invited, which means three candidates for a circuit post, three for a chancery post, and two for a second chancery post. Judge Jimmy Maxwell of [...]
This may be an odd pill for you Red State folks to swallow, but Nate Silver is starting to like Ole Miss’s chances of making the college football championship series.
You heard that right. Apparently, if you use “being in the top four at the end” as a stand in for “making the championship [...]
An email from the mayor is circulating in the legal community, describing a coordinating meeting with law enforcement getting hyper-vigilant. It concludes: “We will be EXCEPTIONALLY diligent in enforcing alcohol odinances and will have ZERO tolerance of people instigating problems LET EVERYONE KNOW that it will be easy to get arrested in Oxford this weekend.”
In a prior posts about standing, I cited a number of Mississippi cases that pretty clearly hold that, while Mississippi has more forgiving rules for standing than the federal cases, there is still a requirement that the plaintiff have a claim of individual injury. In comments, John Pittman Hey pointed to some cases that come very close to saying that just about anyone has standing to assert claims for state actors violating state laws. I’m going to discuss this line of cases below.
For those who don’t want to wade through all of this, here’s my conclusion: This line of cases start with a couple of opinions by Justice McRae, that, at least in the language used, really do take an extremely broad view of standing that would allow virtually anyone to bring suit for violation of the law. The actual facts of the case don’t go quite that far; they involve legislators suing about alleged state law violations mostly involving their interests as legislators. Another important qualification is that there were a couple of later cases where the court did not follow these legislator standing cases, holding there was no standing for certain claims by non-legislators, over dissents by Justice McRae. The later cases did not attempt to distinguish the legislator-standing cases, just citing and quoting them and then holding a particular party did not have standing in spite of whatever the language in the legislator standing cases might suggest. No analysis, just a result.
These cases and the more usual ones make the standing law in Mississippi so disparate that I think standing here is a tossup– if the court wants to reach the merits, it can, and if it doesn’t want to, it can go off on standing. The one factor that may tilt them away from a tossup is that the opinions were by Justice McCrae and the Court has pulled away from them in holdings without doing so in an analytical way.
That leaves a trial judge in a spot, with no principled way of resolving this particular issue. It would be great if the Supreme Court faced this inconsistency and resolved it, but perhaps some judges like rules that don’t so much resolve cases as provide rationales for whichever way they wish to go. Personally, my instincts are that this should be resolved leaning toward the conservative result of saying that there is a requirement a plaintiff show that they, personally, had an injury or interest particular to them before they could file suit. I will explain why if asked.
There is more detail about this than you might want below the fold.
Should I add a category “Where Mississippi caselaw is a mess” for general usage?
Continue reading Notes on the Confederate Memorial Lawsuit: Yes, the Mississippi standing cases are a mess
Miss. Code. Ann. § 55-15-81 is the statute the Sons of Confederate Veterans relies upon. Relating to “Any Revolutionary War, War of 1812, Mexican-American War, War Between the States, Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, Korean War, Vietnam War, Persian Gulf War, War in Iraq or Native American War’s”, the statute provides:
(1) None of the following items, structures or areas may be relocated, removed, disturbed, altered, renamed or rededicated: …statues, monuments, memorials or nameplates (plaques), which have been erected on public property of the state or any of its political subdivisions, … such as local, municipal or county owned public areas, and any statues, monuments, memorials, nameplates (plaques), schools, streets, bridges, buildings, parks preserves, reserves or other public items, structure… which have been dedicated in memory of, or named for, any historical military figure, historical military event, military organization or military unit.
So. A series of “items” “on public property” may not be “removed… renamed.” Those items include “nameplates (plaques)” and “streets…”
That clearly suggest that nameplates and streets cannot be removed or renamed when on public property. And nameplates or plaques can’t be “altered.”
I cannot imagine that a court would hold that the addition of explanatory plaques would be barred by this statute, but I assume that is what the SCV will argue.
What can’t be removed, renamed, or altered? Those “which have been dedicated to the memory of or named for, any historical military figure, historical military event, military organization or military unit.” Hmmm. The Confederate statute is certainly “dedicated to the memory of… any military organization or military unit”– it’s all about the University Grays, isn’t it? But what about Confederate Drive? Not named after a figure or event, certainly, and not really a military organization or unit. Really just indicated it was (and is no longer) the road to the cemetery. Is naming the road “Confederate” by itself naming it for a military organization or unit?
The statute then preserves the right of the pubic body to maintain, preserve, or restore the items, and to move them to a “more suitable location.”
(2) No person may prevent the public body responsible for maintaining any of the items, structures or areas described above from taking proper measures and exercising proper means for the protection, preservation, care, repair or restoration of those items, structures or areas. The governing body may move the memorial to a more suitable location if it is determined that the location is more appropriate to displaying the monument.
The first thing that jumps out at me is the first four words: “No person may prevent….” This clearly bars anyone from interfering with some actions a public body may take. Does it imply a right of action relating to other actions apparently covered by the first section? (I don’t think so but am open to arguments to the contrary). But the balance of the statute does make clear that a public body can make a finding and move the “memorial” to “a more suitable location” if it is “more appropriate…” That would certainly allow the University to move the Confederate statute if it made an appropriate finding. But I don’t think they have any intention of doing that.
Where does that leave the claims? The statute seems to clearly prohibit the renaming of a street that is a memorial to a military unit, but may not cover something as generic as “Confederate” because that is not a “military organization or unit.” The statute would not allow altering the monument itself (but does not seem to prohibit adding explanatory plaques). Section (2) may suggest by implication a private right of action to section (1), by prohibiting anyone contesting some actions that might seem barred under section (1) but not otherwise, but I think not. The suggestion is far from explicit.
For those who want to read the statute straight through, the full text is blow the fold.
Continue reading Notes on the Confederate Memorial Lawsuit: What the statute says