NMissCommentor

Yesterday there was good news for Paul Minor on one issue:  What nexus the federal government had to prove between the federal funds and the case on which the judges were influenced.

Thanks to an email from Habeas, I hear that the Sixth Circuit has decided a bribery case, United States v. Abbey,  that will not represent good news for Minor (although it is excellent news for Goverorn Siegelman) on the issue of quid pro quo requirements and money in politics.

The Sixth Circuit case involves a payment of land as a bribe for decisions by city elected officials.  One key question was quid pro quo. The official argued that the jury instructions were in error for not requiring a specific exchange.  In rejecting this argument, the Sixth Circuit drew a clear distinction for various federal bribery statutes between political contributions and other kinds of payments.  The way the court framed the issue points directly to some of the arguments Paul Minor made:

Abbey’s appeal boils down to a single assertion: that government, to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 666 or the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, must prove a direct link between a specific gift given to a public official and an explicit promise by that official to perform aspecific, identifiable official act in return.

For present purposes, you need to know that the Hobbs Act is, like § 666, a bribery statute.  The question is how much of an exchange was enough to show bribery under that act

But not all quid pro quos are made of the same stuff. The showing necessary may still vary based on context, though all cases require the existence of some kind of agreement between briber and official. Evans modified the standard in non-campaign contribution cases by requiring that the government show only that the official “obtain[ed] a ‘payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.’” United States v. Kelley, 461 F.3d 817, 826 (6th Cir.  2006) (quoting Evans, 504 U.S. at 268). Indeed, in circumstances like this one—outside the campaign context—“[r]ather than requir[e] an explicit quid-pro-quo promise, the elements of extortion are satisfied by something short of a formalized and thoroughly articulated contractual arrangement (i.e., merely knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts is enough).” United States v. Hamilton, 263 F.3d 645, 653 (6th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

Moreover, the “official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in express terms, for otherwise the law’s effect could be frustrated by knowing winks and nods.”

The court is drawing lines between political contributions and payments made in other contexts; the linkage between the payment and the decision does not have to be as tight when the payments are not political contributions.  While Minor’s side asserts the loan guaranties were political contributions, they were not reported as such.  For one, the money was used to buy a house.  If the Fifth Circuit applies the logic in this case, I think it does pretty serious damage to any arguement that there was no quid pro quo.